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Abstract 
Disguised propaganda and political deception in digital media have been studied 
since the early days of the World Wide Web. At the intersection of internet re-
search and propaganda studies, this chapter explores disguised propaganda on 
websites and social media platforms. Based on a discussion of key concepts and 
terminology, the chapter outlines how new modes of deception and source obfus-
cation emerge in digital and social media environments, and how this develop-
ment complicates existing conceptual and epistemological frameworks in propa-
ganda studies. The chapter concludes by arguing that contemporary challenges of 
detecting and countering disguised propaganda can only be resolved, if social 
media companies are held accountable and provide the necessary support for user 
contestation.  
Keywords: disguised propaganda, manipulation, disinformation, fake news, de-
ception, social media. 
Introduction 
@cj_panirman: RT @realDonaldTrump: Time to #DrainTheSwamp in Wash-
ington, D.C. and VOTE #TrumpPence16 on 11/8/2016. Together, we will 
MAKE AMERICA SAFE ... 
@natespuewell: #NeverTrump Those fake, nonsense polls are actually real, 
good polls, Trump's spokesman insists — Campaign of lies 
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https://t.co/Mvja0PPeaH (Bessi and Ferrara 2016) 
At first glance, the above quotes from Twitter during the 2016 U.S. elections come off 
as deriving from citizens supporting the Republican candidate, Donald Trump and the 
Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton respectively. In fact, they were both produced 
by social bots, software-driven social media profiles created to give a deceptive im-
pression of public support (Bessi and Ferrara 2016). Since the dawn of the World Wide 
Web, political groups and activists have appropriated digital platforms to further parti-
san agendas based on a range of dissemination tactics (Milan 2013). With the evolution 
of digital technologies and platforms, communication strategies have developed con-
currently, as political actors have iteratively sought to increase their influence. This 
chapter examines the evolution of disguised propaganda in digital media, relying on 
identity deception to manipulate online users.  
With the development of digital platforms from websites to social media environments, 
new modes of propaganda have emerged. Situated at the intersection of propaganda 
studies and internet research, this chapter provides an overview of the development of 
disguised propaganda from digital to social media. First, the chapter outlines the his-
torical relationship between propaganda and mass media technologies, as conceptual-
ized within the field of propaganda studies. Second, the chapter presents a working 
definition of disguised propaganda, including the sub-categories of obfuscated and im-
personated propaganda (also defined as grey and black propaganda). Third, the chapter 
examines the use of disguised propaganda on relatively static websites, followed by an 
inquiry into disguised propaganda on social media platforms. Finally, the chapter dis-
cusses contemporary and future problems of resistance against disguised propaganda. 
Propaganda and media 
Although the roots and etymology of propaganda predates electronic communication 
by several centuries (Auerbach and Castronovo 2013), scholarly engagement with the 
topic has historically been inseparable from the rise of mass media technologies in the 
20th century. Accordingly, the field of propaganda studies has traditionally defined 
propaganda as intimately connected to media channels such as radio, television, film, 
and newspapers. In his book Public Opinion, Walter Lippmann (1946) referred to “the 
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manufacture of consent” as “capable of great refinements” (98), a process of manipu-
lation open to anyone who understands and can control it. Herman and Chomsky (1988) 
in their influential work Manufacturing Consent define propaganda as phenomena that 
“require the collaboration of the mass media” (Herman and Chomsky 1988, 33). Simi-
larly, Ellul argued that propaganda “cannot exist without using these mass media“ (El-
lul 1965, 9). Later, Cunningham (2002) wrote that it would be “problematic for us to 
read anything like modern and contemporary propaganda back into periods before the 
emergence of mass media and mass communication” (17-18). Propaganda, as mani-
fested in the 20th century, is perceived as a distinctly modern phenomenon interwoven 
with channels of mass communication. 
This points to a second characteristic of propaganda, as defined within the field of prop-
aganda studies, namely the source of propaganda. Many scholars define propaganda as 
de facto propagated by large organizations such as political and military institutions or 
commercial corporations (see Ellul 1965, Herman and Chomsky 1988, Sproule 1994). 
As Sproule (1994) argues: 
Propaganda represents the work of large organizations or groups to win over the 
public for special interests through a massive orchestration of attractive conclusions 
packaged to conceal both their persuasive purpose and lack of sound supporting rea-
sons.  
(Sproule 1994, 8, added emphasis). 
From this perspective, propaganda encompasses mass-mediated manipulation orga-
nized on a grand scale to persuade a public. The goal of such persuasion is typically 
“closely attuned to elite interests” (Herman and Chomsky 1988, 32). Not all scholars, 
however, exclusively attribute propaganda to elite groups. This is central to this chapter, 
as digital media’s decentralized mode of content production challenges the perception 
that propaganda only derives from centralized sources. As a conceptual vocabulary to 
distinguish between hierarchical and non-hierarchical propaganda, Ellul (1965) pro-
poses the concepts of vertical and horizontal propaganda. 
As part of a rigorous typology, Ellul (1965) introduces the concepts of vertical and 
horizontal propaganda to distinguish between propaganda from societal elites and from 
Pr
e-p
rin
Pre-Print – final version available at:  
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1202-4_33-1 
 
 4 
small citizen groups. Accordingly, Ellul (1965) argues that not all propaganda is con-
nected to political, military, or commercial organizations, although it is “by far the most 
widespread” (80). To Ellul (1965), vertical propaganda is characterized by originating 
from elites who rely on mass media to persuade an audience into submission and action. 
One-to-many communication channels are vital in this regard, as they are means of 
mass mobilization of crowds to do the bidding of the source (e.g. the government, party 
leader, general, or company).  
Vertical propaganda is particularly effective in propaganda of agitation, which is cre-
ated to mobilize crowds against a portrayed enemy, a “source of all misery” (Ellul 1965, 
75). Hitler’s campaigns against the Jews and Lenin’s campaigns against the Kulaks are 
both examples of such propaganda. In practice, Ellul (1965) argues, agitational cam-
paigns always derive from societal elites. Yet, propaganda of agitation can be effective 
in getting the audience to take ownership of the constructed narrative, amplifying and 
extending it. If successful, agitational propaganda does therefore not necessarily rely 
on a continuous orchestration of mass media, as “each person seized by it” can in turn 
become their own “propagandist” (Ellul 1965, 74).  
Conversely to vertical and agitational propaganda, horizontal and integrational prop-
aganda are aimed at “stabilizing the social body, at unifying and reinforcing it” (Ellul 
1965, 75). These forms of propaganda can originate from both societal elites, such as 
governments seeking to stabilize societies during political crises, and from citizens. 
Horizontal propaganda relies on small, autonomous groups cooperating based on a 
common ideology. It is distinct by deriving from inside the population and “not from 
the top” (Ellul 1965, 81). According to Ellul (1965), this form of propaganda is a rare 
phenomenon, non-existent before the 20th century. The decentralized propaganda of 
Mao’s China is highlighted as an example. Unlike vertical propaganda, which “needs 
the huge apparatus of the mass media of communication” (Ellul 1965, 82), horizontal 
propaganda only relies on a “huge organization of people” (82). Media control, in other 
words, is inseparable from vertical propaganda, but is not similarly fundamental for 
horizontal propaganda. Table 1 presents an overview of the conceptual differences be-
tween the two. 
<Insert Table 1 - Characteristics of vertical and horizontal propaganda > 
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Propaganda and digital media 
Within the last decade, scholars in propaganda studies have argued that the rise of 
digital media complicates existing theoretical understandings of propaganda, specifi-
cally the relationship between propaganda, large-scale organizations, and mass media 
(Jowett and O’Donnell 2012; Auerbach and Castronovo 2013). Models of propaganda 
that illustrate how media conglomerates and governments together manufacture sys-
temic biases have somewhat lost their pertinence (Auerbach and Castronovo 2013). 
The fundamental notion that propaganda relies on centralized control of mass media 
by large-scale organizations does not seem to encapsulate digital spaces in which 
propaganda can potentially derive from a multitude of sources. This development sig-
nifies a transformation of how scholars should analyze and approach propaganda: 
The Internet is now becoming an increasingly important source of information in 
our society… The potential for propaganda in such a climate is infinite. Anyone can 
spread a message, true or false, or manipulate information or even alter a picture to 
suit his or her own ends.  
(Jowett & O’Donnell 2012, 160, added emphasis) 
In online environments  millions of users operate with crosscutting motives and goals, 
which challenges and alters the analysts’ task of identifying coordinated propaganda 
campaigns and their underlying political agendas. Clear-cut conceptual boundaries, 
such as that between vertical and horizontal propaganda, seem to be reshaped into 
complex continuums going from propaganda at the individual level to that of nation 
states and multinational conglomerates. Digital media platforms introduce new mo-
dalities of propaganda, such as the use of social bots (Shao et al. 2017) and state-orga-
nized ‘troll armies’ (Aro 2016). Taken together, these changes could seem to repre-
sent the end, or at least a new beginning, for the field of propaganda studies, but this 
would be an oversimplified conclusion. Although the internet challenges existing con-
ceptualizations of propaganda, scholars should not be “lulled into thinking that infor-
mation is now open and free for all” (Auerbach and Castronovo 2013, 12). Digital 
media’s potential for decentralized communication, in other words, should not be 
equated to a fundamental democratization of information, transcending existing 
power relations and control.  
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Herman and Chomsky (2008) argue that the rise of digital media represents a vital 
new means of communication for political movements across the globe. Yet, the in-
ternet should not be seen as a fundamentally democratizing force, destabilizing socie-
tal elites and their ability to exercise control through mass orchestrated propaganda. 
As with all new communication technologies, Herman and Chomsky argue, the inter-
net will first and foremost serve elite and corporate interests. Consequently, the inter-
net functions as means of control to those already in power more than it represents 
“an instrument of mass communication for those lacking brand names, an already ex-
isting audience, and/or large resources” (Herman and Chomsky 2008). Rather than re-
inventing the wheel, we need to build upon conceptualizations and terminology of 
propaganda studies to understand the consequences of disguised propaganda in digital 
and social media. 
Disguised propaganda: Obfuscated and impersonated forms 
Propaganda has been defined as the “deliberate, systematic attempt to shape percep-
tions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers 
the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012, 7). Drawing on 
this definition, disguised propaganda can be defined as the deliberate use of disguised 
sources to manipulate and shape perceptions to achieve a desired outcome. Within 
the field of propaganda studies, this specific type of manipulation has also been la-
beled covert (Ellul 1965; Sproule 1994; Linebarger 2010), clandestine (Soley and 
Nichols 1987), or concealed propaganda (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012). These terms 
all point to a specific form of deceptive manipulation, relying on a tactical blurring 
and misattribution of sources. Drawing on Hancock (2012), disguised propaganda can 
be defined as a form of identity-based deception, which stands in contrast to message-
based deception (in which content is manipulated, rather than its source). As such, 
disguised propaganda relies on the manipulation of sources, but not necessarily on the 
falsification of presented messages (although the two are often interconnected).  
Overall, disguised propaganda can be divided into two sub-categories: grey and black 
propaganda (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012). In grey propaganda, sources are deliber-
ately obfuscated, making it either impossible or difficult to identify the propagandist 
hiding underneath (Sproule 1994). In black propaganda, disseminated messages are 
attributed to a false source, which is “presented by the propagandizer as coming from 
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a source inside the propagandized” (Becker 1949). Black propaganda, in other words, 
relies on deceiving an audience into believing that a distributed message derives from 
an opposing source to the actual one (e.g. an ally rather than an enemy). Both grey 
and black propaganda stand in contrast to white propaganda, which encompasses ma-
nipulation in which the actual source is known and visible. The conceptual vocabulary 
of white, grey, and black propaganda has been used extensively within the field of 
propaganda studies (Becker 1949; Ellul 1965; Daniels 2009a; Soley and Nichols 
1987; Jowett and O’Donnell 2012). However, as Daniels (2009a) argues, these con-
cepts have a substantial downside due to their misfortunate racial connotations. Build-
ing on this critique, this chapter proposes the terms identifiable (white), obfuscated 
(grey), and impersonated (black) propaganda as a working alternative to the long-
standing, yet problematic terms. 
 
Forms of disguised propaganda represent an innately challenging object of investiga-
tion due to the difficulty of untangling concealed sources and intentions (Jowett and 
O’Donnell 2012). In some cases, manipulated sources can only be studied retrospec-
tively after historical documents surface (Soley and Nichols 1987). Yet, analysts can 
advantageously deploy a number of investigative strategies to determine the hidden 
identity of the propagandist. One such strategy relies on analyzing “the apparent ide-
ology, purpose, and context of the propaganda message. The analyst can then ask, 
who or what has the most to gain from this?” (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012, 293). If 
analysts can establish the intended outcome of disguised propaganda, this will point to 
the underlying source. Studying the context and effects of propaganda are key in this 
regard. To Jowett and O’Donnell (2012), the hidden source will typically be ”an insti-
tution or organization, with the propagandist as its leader or agent” (293). Using the 
conceptual vocabulary of Ellul (1965), disguised propaganda is thus first and fore-
most conceptualized as a form of vertical propaganda.  
An early example of impersonated propaganda of agitation in mass media is The Pro-
tocols of the Elders of Zion, which was written by the Czar Nicholas II’s secret police 
in 1903 and distributed through Russian newspapers (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012). 
On the surface, the text reveals a devious Jewish plot for world domination conceived 
by Jewish representatives at a secret congress. In reality, it is a deliberate fraud to pro-
mote anti-Semitism. Nonetheless, the text became influential in European politics, 
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cited by Hitler in his infamous Mein Kampf and used in Nazi propaganda (Jowett and 
O’Donnell 2012). As such, it accompanied the psychological warfare of the Second 
World War.  
Disguised propaganda plays a key role in modern-day psychological warfare, which 
encompasses “the use of propaganda against an enemy together with other operational 
measures of a military, economic, or political nature” (Linebarger 2010, 40). During 
both The Second World War and The Cold War, military units and intelligence agen-
cies in countries such as Germany, The United Kingdom, The U.S., and The Soviet 
Union all orchestrated large-scale disguised propaganda campaigns against their ene-
mies (Becker 1949; Soley and Nichols 1987). Radio represented a particularly power-
ful medium in this regard, as it enabled fast and widespread dissemination of subver-
sive content into enemy territories (Soley and Nichols 1987). Despite the effective-
ness of clandestine radio, such propaganda posed great challenges to its creators, as it 
required both an elaborate orchestration of media technologies as well as “operatives 
thoroughly acquainted with every relevant aspect of the society and culture in ques-
tion” (Becker 1949, 224).   
The development of digital media technologies complicates the fundamental notion 
that disguised propaganda de facto derives from large-scale organizations through 
one-to-many communication channels. With digital media’s decentralized mode of 
content production and propagation, the number of potential sources has risen dramat-
ically. This complicates existing analytical frameworks for identifying and analyzing 
sources of disguised propaganda. Nonetheless, the prominence of digital media 
should not be seen as the end of large-scale propaganda orchestration (see Auerbach 
and Castronovo 2013; Herman and Chomsky 2008). 
Disguised propaganda in digital media 
Identity deception and disinformation have been studied since the early days of the 
World Wide Web. Some of the first to discuss the risks of online manipulation were 
scholars from information science, studying the internet’s role as an educational tool 
(see SantaVicca 1994; Tate and Alexander 1996). In other disciplines, scholars studied 
identity deception in Usenet groups (see Donath 1998; Dahlberg 2001) and the potential 
risk of the internet becoming a “disinformation superhighway” (Floridi 1996, 509). 
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Steering away from a techno-determinism, Floridi (1996) argued that, although “tech-
nology sharpens the problems of disinformation…the fundamental questions remain 
human and social” (513). Deception and manipulation, in other words, might take new 
forms online, yet the underlying roots and causes would remain the same.  
 
Dahlberg (2001) was one of the first to argue that deception represented a potential 
hindrance for the internet to ever become a space of democratic deliberation: 
 
Many discussion groups, including those dedicated to 'serious' political issues, 
face the problem postings aimed to misinform, embarrass, self-promote, pro-
voke, gossip, trivialize, and so on... Verifiable online evidence is often hardest 
to come by in cases where support for claims is most crucial… These verifica-
tion problems can inhibit online interactions from realizing the deliberative 
conception where only 'the force of better argument' decides outcomes. 
(Dahlberg 2001, 19-20) 
 
Donath (1998) presents a similar argument, stating that deception was both common 
and harmful in digital media environments. To Donath (1998), limited identity cues 
online made deception particularly treacherous, as information “is more likely to be 
believed when offered by one who is perceived to be an expert” (Donath 1998, 31). 
Any user could deceive others by disguising their identity behind profiles or websites 
claiming to be trustworthy and authoritative. Accessibility and affordability of content 
production made deception much easier, as “documents, photographic evidence, and 
whole organizations can be readily fabricated” (Dahlberg 2001, 19). An early exam-
ple of such deception strategies can be found on martinlutherking.org. 
Martinlutherking.org, which was launched in 1999 (Thomson 2011), is a website de-
liberately constructed to promote white supremacy based on a difficult-to-identify 
source. At first glance, the website appears to be educational and scientific by claim-
ing to provide ‘A True Historical Examination’ of Martin Luther King. Nonetheless, 
the site (which is still active at the time of writing this chapter) one-sidedly portrays 
Dr. King as a rapist, communist, women-beater, and sexual deviant (Daniels 2009a, 
2009b). Drawing on the conceptual works from propaganda studies (as discussed in 
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the previous sections), martinlutherking.org is a case of obfuscated propaganda, as the 
site does not clearly disclose its authorship. In 2008, Daniels conducted a pilot study 
in which she asked adolescent internet users to search for Martin Luther King on 
Google and find a suitable website for a school paper (Daniels 2008). The result of 
the study showed that numerous adolescents – including experienced internet users – 
found martinlutherking.org and were unable to identify the disguised authorship. A 
majority of participants concluded that the website would be a suitable source for a 
school paper. 
Apart from being a case of obfuscated propaganda, martinlutherking.org is also hori-
zontal propaganda, as the website is not created by a large-scale institution, but by an 
individual, Don Black – a former grand wizard of the Ku Klux Klan who funded the 
website through donations (Daniels 2009b). As noted, disguised propaganda in radio, 
newspapers, film, and television has historically been closely connected to large-scale 
organizations, as these channels required substantial resources. In digital media, this 
is different, as expenses for buying and maintaining a web domain is minimal in com-
parison to mass mediated campaigns. This enables small groups or individuals to or-
chestrate campaigns, including propaganda of agitation. In the typology of Ellul 
(1965), horizontal propaganda of agitation is non-existent, as individuals cannot or-
chestrate the necessary media technologies. Following Daniels’ (2014), however, dig-
ital media enable such propaganda due to low barriers of content production and pro-
liferation. This makes the internet potentially powerful for individuals or groups seek-
ing to further political agendas through manipulative means: 
One of the many promises of digital media is that it opens up the possibility for 
multiple perspectives… If the wonder of the open Internet is that anyone can create 
and publish content online, it is also simultaneously the distress, as those who in-
tend to deceive create and publish cloaked websites. (Daniels 2014, 151) 
Daniels (2009a, 2014) uses the term cloaked websites to designate disguised propa-
ganda on websites. Other notable examples of such propaganda promoting white su-
premacy are The Institute of Historical Review (Daniels 2009b; Foxman and Wolf 
2013), American Civil Rights Review (Daniels 2009b) and The Occidental Quarterly 
(Mihailovic 2015). All these sites disguise their underlying political goals and ideolo-
gies. Racism, however, is not the only disguised agenda online. Various websites 
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have used similar tactics. Teen Breaks, is an example of a disguised, pseudo-scientific 
website aimed at convincing young pregnant women to renounce abortion (Daniels 
2014). Makah.org was an impersonated (or black) propaganda website created by ani-
mal rights activists to discredit the Makah Indian Tribe for harvesting whales (Piper 
2001). Gwbus.com was a parody website created by left-wing activists during the 
George W. Bush election campaign to deceive people into thinking it was an official 
website and to mock Bush (Foot and Schneider 2002). A majority of these websites 
are horizontal propaganda, as they do not derive from societal elites or powerful or-
ganizations. Yet, large-scale corporations have also orchestrated disguised campaigns 
through websites.  
Astroturfing refers to persuasion campaigns orchestrated by organizations to give a 
false impression of public support for or against a specific topic, which serves their 
agenda (Leiser 2016). The term derives from AstroTurf, which is a brand of synthetic 
turf playing grass, thus highlighting the contrast between orchestrated support and ac-
tual grass roots movements (Zhang et al. 2013). Astroturfing is a form of disguised, 
vertical propaganda aimed at creating the impression of horizontal, political support. 
Notable early examples of astroturfing websites are Working Families for Wal-Mart, 
The Center for Food and Agricultural Research, and Americans for Technology Lead-
ership (Leiser 2016). These organizations all claimed to represent independent advo-
cate groups, yet were in fact funded and orchestrated by Wal-Mart, Monsanto, and 
Microsoft respectively. These corporations tactically used the organizations to counter 
negative attention towards their brands and attack commercial and political oppo-
nents. Governments in countries such as China and Russia have in recent years used 
similar tactics on a much greater scale, relying on paid users to influence political dis-
course on social media (Tong and Lei 2013; Aro 2016; King et al. 2017).  
All in all, digital media have complicated existing conceptualizations of disguised 
propaganda as de facto deriving from large-scale organizations. Yet, as the above ex-
amples highlight, it would be problematic to assume that digital media have erased 
vertical propaganda. Lines between vertical and horizontal propaganda seem increas-
ingly blurred, as individuals, groups, and powerful organization can all potentially 
create and orchestrate disguised campaigns within the same online environments. Po-
litical and military organizations have systematically sought to take advantage of this 
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situation, ushering in a new era of propaganda, surveillance, and censorship: 
Civilian communication networks, including the Internet, are now fully intertwined 
with military communications, a situation that has led to networks being retooled 
for surveillance, control and information warfare. These pressures are also eroding 
formerly distinct elements of media–public diplomacy–military relations…   
(Winseck 2008, 420)  
The boundaries between national and global media systems, media producers and 
consumers, military operations and politics become increasingly fluid online. The fol-
lowing section seeks to examine this development, focusing on the global rise of so-
cial media – e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, and WeChat – and the con-
tinued evolution of vertical and horizontal disguised propaganda on these platforms. 
Disguised propaganda on social media 
Social media are online platforms that enable large-scale proliferation of user-gener-
ated content based on many-to-many communication (Castells 2013). However, since 
all media technologies that support human communication can essentially be consid-
ered social, the term social media “obscures the unpleasant truth that ‘social media’ is 
the takeover of the social by the corporate” (Baym 2015, 1). During the last decade, 
the number of social media users have grown exponentially, with Facebook reaching 
two billion users in 2017 (Chaykowski 2017). As such, human interaction – whether 
in relation to political, cultural, or everyday life – increasingly takes place in social 
media environments. This development gives rise to new modalities of both vertical 
and horizontal propaganda, produced by propagandists and validated and amplified by 
users through comments, likes, re-tweets, and shares. 
Corporate social media platforms have a profound influence on social relations, as 
they not only facilitate interactions, but also actively shape them: 
Sociality is not simply "rendered technological" by moving to an online space; ra-
ther, coded structures are profoundly altering the nature of our connections, crea-
tions, and interactions. Buttons that impose "sharing" and "following" as social 
values have effects in cultural practices and legal disputes, far beyond platforms 
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proper.  
(van Dijck 2013, 20) 
Researchers should consequently approach social media with attentiveness towards the 
interrelation between technological and social processes. This, however, is a difficult 
task, as the visibility of how social media influence social relations through algorithms 
and interfaces (and vice versa) has not become greater alongside their ubiquity (van 
Dijck 2013). Following this argument, disguised propaganda on social media should 
not simply be seen as old wine in new bottles, but as new, socio-technical phenomena 
arising at the intersection of social relations and digital architectures. In this context, 
user engagement is central, as social media content spreads through user networks. 
Studying disguised propaganda on social media thus requires researchers to closely ex-
amine the relationship between producers, audiences/distributers, and platform archi-
tectures. 
In the context of horizontal propaganda, social media have lowered the cost of digital 
content production. Whereas websites (only) required the purchase and maintenance of 
a web domain, social network sites (SNSs) are available to anyone with a working 
computer or smartphone with Wi-Fi access. This has opened up a new venue for indi-
viduals and small groups seeking to further agendas through manipulation. Cloaked 
websites, as a form of obfuscated propaganda, typically present content as serious and 
trustworthy, while concealing the website’s authorship (Daniels 2009a). SNSs such as 
Facebook, which are based on personal profiles and the display of personal networks, 
are particularly well suited for impersonated forms of propaganda. Reliability and trust 
of a disguised social media profile is created by carefully constructing a false identity 
and maintaining it through posts that are validated through user comments, likes and 
shares. A user who ‘likes’ or ‘befriends’ a disguised profile or page can thus potentially 
contribute to both its distribution and validation. 
A popular definition of SNSs argues that their key characteristics are the ability to cre-
ate a public or semi-public profile, make connections known, and view and navigate 
these connections (boyd and Ellison 2007) These authors later revised the connectivity 
function by including production of and interaction with streams of user-generated con-
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tent (Ellison and boyd 2013). The profile itself can be defined as “a portrait of an indi-
vidual as an expression of action, a node in a series of groups, and a repository of self- 
and other-provided data” (Ellison and Boyd 2013, 154). Similarly, conceptualizing so-
cial media more generally as “personal media assemblage and archives” (Good 2013, 
560) allows us to consider the identity created through SNSs as central for analyzing 
disguised sources. Combining these characteristics, disguised propaganda on social me-
dia is: based on a (cloaked) identity created through a profile or page; a stream of user-
generated content; and an identity that is continuously reproduced and negotiated in 
interactions between posts and comments. Moreover, disguised propaganda on SNSs is 
rarely permanent, but exists in an interactive process of creation, deletion (due to vio-
lations of SNS platforms’ terms of use), and recreation (Farkas et al. 2017).  
 
One example of impersonated propaganda on social media is their use to distribute and 
amplify racist discourses concerning ethno-cultural minorities. In 2015, anonymous 
propagandists in Denmark successfully provoked users by constructing fake Muslim 
identities on Facebook, claiming that Muslims were plotting to kill and rape (non-Mus-
lim) Danes (Farkas et al. 2017). Through 11 Facebook pages, propagandists attracted 
more than 20.000 comments from Danish Facebook users. The most commented page, 
which existed for less than four days before Facebook deleted it, attracted more than 
10.000 comments. A majority of users who reacted to these cases of impersonated prop-
aganda of agitation expressed aggression towards the pages as well as Muslims in gen-
eral. Through hateful comments, the pages turned into sites of overt hatred and racism. 
Due to Facebook’s design (which provides almost unlimited anonymity and security to 
page owners), the propagandists behind the fake identities were able to remain com-
pletely anonymous. This differs from cloaked websites where sources are obfuscated, 
yet often identifiable at closer inspection (Daniels, 2009a). On social media, it can be 
impossible to establish with certainty, whether individuals or an organized group cre-
ated a page and posts, i.e. whether it is vertical or horizontal propaganda.  
 
As stated, propaganda analysts can examine disguised sources and intentions by asking 
the basic question of “who or what has the most to gain from this?” (Jowett and O’Don-
nell 2012, 293). This analytical strategy is useful in the context traditional mass media, 
where disguised propaganda is often orchestrated by a limited number of large-scale 
Pr
-pr
i t
Pre-Print – final version available at:  
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1202-4_33-1 
 
 15 
organizations (Ellul 1965; Jowett and O’Donnell 2012). On social media, however, this 
investigation strategy is challenged. Determining ‘who gains the most’ is difficult, 
when propaganda can potentially derive from a small partisan group, a large-scale or-
ganization, or even a single individual seeking to further an agenda or simply provoking 
others by trolling (Phillips 2012). This raises new epistemological challenges (Schou 
and Farkas 2016): How can we investigate disguised sources and intentions on social 
media? How does the credibility of a social media profile or page increase through its 
likes, shares, and comments? How can users become more critical of information 
streams produced by aggressive and hateful posts as well as antagonistic reactions? And 
how can we assess the magnitude and significance of disguised propaganda, when fake 
profiles can reach thousands of users within days, before social media companies delete 
them? These questions require urgent scholarly attention. 
 
In the context of vertical propaganda, large-scale organizations take advantage of the 
decentralized structure of social media by orchestrating far-reaching campaigns that are 
nonetheless difficult to identify as such. Two vital components in this regard are the 
use of so-called troll armies and social bots for social media astroturfing (Benedictus 
2016). On social media, astroturfing encompasses the orchestration of user profiles by 
an organization, such as a government agency or private corporation, to simulate public 
support or opposition towards a particular topic. This form of disguised manipulation 
can serve as both propaganda of agitation and integration, as organizations seek to con-
solidate power through attacks on perceived opponents as well through the manufac-
turing of widespread support. Astroturfing can also rely on both obfuscated and imper-
sonated sources, as organizations might pay users to post content from their own social 
media accounts or through networks of fictitious profiles. In practice, these modalities 
are often interconnected. In China and Russia, government agencies have orchestrated 
large-scale troll armies, in which people are paid to promote government agendas 
through social media profiles (Tong and Lei 2013, Benedictus 2016). In China, this has 
been coined the ‘50-cents party’, as users were rumored to receive 50 cents for each 
social media post they create in support of the government (Aro 2016).  
 
Large-scale organizations engage in social media astroturfing for a number of reasons. 
This form of disguised propaganda can potentially have widespread influence on public 
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opinion and be an effective tool to silence critics through aggressive campaigns (Aro 
2016). Astroturfing might also serve to divert public attention from contemporary crises 
by flooding social media with non-related content. This method, which relies on a “stra-
tegic distraction from collective action, grievances, or general negativity” (King et al. 
2017), has been used extensively in China, where the government is estimated to or-
chestrate 448 million social media posts per year (King et al. 2017). This content is first 
and foremost produced by human laborers (King et al. 2017), yet astroturfing can also 
rely on social bots.  
 
Social bots are user profiles controlled by software that algorithmically produce and 
disseminate content. During the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, a large-scale study 
estimates that close to 20 percent of all content on Twitter concerning the elections was 
produced by social bots (Bessi and Ferrara 2016). Bots were found on both sides of the 
political spectrum, although a majority supported the Republican candidate, Donald 
Trump (Kollanyi et al. 2016). A key application of bots was to disseminate conspiracy 
theories and disinformation, popularly referred to as ‘fake news’ (Shao et al. 2017). As 
of the time of writing, the U.S. Congress is investigating whether some of this activity 
was orchestrated by Russian agencies (Wakabayashi and Shane 2017), but despite the 
potential political implications of these activities, it remains difficult to identify the 
sources behind automated propaganda: 
  
Concluding, it is important to stress that… it is impossible to determine who operates 
such bots. State- and non-state actors, local and foreign governments, political par-
ties, private organizations, and even single individuals with adequate resources… 
could deploy armies of social bots and affect the directions of online political con-
versation. 
(Bessi and Ferrara 2016) 
 
As with all disguised propaganda on social media, platforms’ decentralized mode of 
content proliferation and potential anonymity provided for propagandists complicate 
both epistemological boundaries and empirical investigations of vertical and horizontal 
propaganda. This raises serious and urgent questions of accountability, transparency, 
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and contestation of disguised propaganda – for scholars, users, policy makers, law en-
forcement, and (perhaps most importantly) the corporations owning these platforms. So 
far, social media companies have largely placed the responsibility for countering these 
phenomena on users. However, this strategy is not a viable solution to contemporary or 
future democratic consequences posed by disguised propaganda.  
 
Countering disguised propaganda on social media 
The vast popularity of social media platforms makes it difficult for companies, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, to identify and moderate problematic content. As a solution to 
this challenge, companies construct their policy enforcement principles around user en-
gagement, often deploying commercial content moderators solely when users flag con-
tent for violations of company policies (Roberts 2016). Reimagining and reengineering 
this division of labor is a difficult endeavor:  
 
The huge numbers of members that popular social media sites boast and the vast 
volume of content these members post make it impossible for the staff of the host 
companies to pro-actively monitor and edit the contents. As we've seen, the only 
way content guidelines - in particular, those related to hate speech - can be applied 
is through the active engagement of real people… Almost inevitable, this task falls 
mainly on the users of the social media sites. 
(Foxman and Wolf 2013, 106) 
 
Identifying hate speech and disguised propaganda has to rely on human judgment, as 
algorithms cannot adequately analyze cultural contexts of each post (at least not yet). 
Due to the ubiquity of social media platforms, such human judgment has to derive from 
users. Following this argument, an encouraging solution to disguised propaganda could 
seem to be the formation of citizen groups, actively fighting propaganda by reporting 
fake pages and profiles to social media companies. Promising as this initiative may be, 
users can only superficially counteract disguised propaganda under current conditions 
(Farkas and Neumayer 2017).  
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There are many challenges involved in building alternative spaces to fight disguised 
propaganda on social media platforms. New forms of digital editing tools make it in-
creasingly difficult to determine, if pictures and videos are manipulated. The decentral-
ized structure of social media platforms makes it difficult to find and contest propa-
ganda before it potentially reaches a wide audience. The biggest challenge, however, is 
the way in which social media companies place the responsibility for countering prop-
aganda on their users, yet only provide limited and opaque opportunities for them to 
act. As a result, tactics to manipulate users become increasingly sophisticated, while 
collective resistance cannot.  
 
The idea of empowerment of crowds acting and creating together has been present in 
early discourses about social media. Tim O’Reilly coined the term Web 2.0 with one 
key component being the “wisdom of the crowds” (O’Reilly 2005). For social media 
companies, crowdsourcing became an effective marketing discourse, in which they pre-
sent their platforms as spaces of participation, decentralization, spontaneous interac-
tion, and lack of hierarchy – ideas hijacked from the radical left (Žižek 2009). In the 
case of fighting disguised propaganda, these ideas about social media shift the respon-
sibility to the users. They, however, have to navigate limitations of architectures and 
policies provided by social media corporations. Instead of empowering activists, 
“power has partly shifted to the technological mechanisms and algorithmic selections 
operated by large social media corporations” (Poell and van Dijck 2015, 534)  
 
On Facebook, users are provided only with a ‘report’ button to notify the company of 
content violations (Farkas and Neumayer 2017). How Facebook processes these reports 
remains highly opaque. Consequently, users cannot know how or on what grounds Fa-
cebook takes action. Even if Facebook deletes a profile or page, the creators can typi-
cally remain anonymous and continue their work. This makes it incredibly difficult for 
users or authorities to hold anyone accountable. These challenges also complicate the 
work of journalists or researchers trying to study the implications of disguised propa-
ganda, as a page or profile might reach thousands of users within days and then disap-
pear without notice. To limit the potential contemporary and future threat of disguised 
propaganda, users should be able to identify, mobilize, organize, and collectively resist 
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manipulation much more effectively. Although anonymity can be beneficial for demo-
cratic discussion in many ways, it is problematic for counter-action that creators of 
disguised propaganda can stay completely anonymous and avoid any consequences. 
For this to change, social media corporations need to be held accountable for countering 
propaganda on their platforms. In the current situation, crowdsourced user actions 
mainly seem to serve as a diversion from corporate responsibility and questions of ac-
countability. 
 
Conclusion 
Disguised propaganda has undergone a series of profound changes alongside techno-
logical developments throughout the 20th and 21st century: from impersonated propa-
ganda in early 1900s newspapers (e.g. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion), to clan-
destine radio during the Second World War, all the way up until present-day social 
bots and troll armies on social media. Alongside this significant evolution, scholarly 
contributions, such as analytical and epistemological frameworks, are continuously 
challenged. As this chapter has made apparent, digital media platforms complicate the 
fundamental notion of disguised propaganda de facto deriving from large-scale organ-
izations. Additionally, digital media challenge existing conceptual boundaries, such as 
Ellul’s (1965) conceptualization of vertical and horizontal propaganda. These tech-
nical developments, however, do by no means render these profound conceptual 
works redundant. Contrarily, revisiting concepts of propaganda studies (such as Ellul 
1965); Sproule 1994; and Herman and Chomsky 1988) enables us to explore how dis-
guised propaganda changes in digital and social media, but also to outline their conti-
nuity across different media technologies. More scholarly engagement with disguised 
propaganda on social media is necessary to further develop concepts at the intersec-
tion of internet research and propaganda studies. Research in this field should expand 
methodological, analytical, conceptual, and epistemological frameworks, but also 
support resistance against disguised propaganda that produces hatred and racism. 
Scholars should not only strive to understand the development of propaganda, but also 
challenge and contest manipulation and deception in contemporary and future online 
spaces. 
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